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TEE CONTENT OF COVENANTS IN LEASES
N determining what covenants in a lease will run so as to be
enforceable by or against the assignee of the lessee or lessor,
the formula that has been consecrated to this problem is that
the covenant "must affect the nature, quality, or value of the thing
demised or the mode of occupying it." This phrase which was
used by Lord ELLENmOROUGH in Congleton v. Pattison' is an expan-

sion of the statement in Spencer's case2 that such a covenant
must "touch or concern the thing demised." A second statement
not so frequently quoted is that of BisT,

J.,

in Vyvzyan v, Arthur3

that "if it be beneficial without regard to his continuing owner of
the estate, it is a mere collateral covenant upon which the assignee
cannot sue." The purpose of this article is to examine the various
covenants that have been held to be embraced within one or both
of these two generalizations and to show that these covenants are
in reality of three different species, each having its own legal
characteristics. 4 Some preliminary observations must be made;
the question as to what phraseology must be used in order to make
a covenant run; the further question of whether, if a covenant is
of a sort that may run it must run, or may nevertheless, if the parties
so elect, be made purely personal, will not be considered; nor will the
covenants for title be taken up.
The formula that a covenant runs if it affects the nature, quality,
or value of the thing demised or the mode of occupying it, as giving
a practical rule for settling whether any given covenant does or
does not run, is a prioriopen to two objections. First, it is vague; the
words "nature or quality" are not terms that have a legal meaning;
they are popular merely; the phrase "thing demised" may include
only the physical corpus, or it may include the estate; the latter
part of the formula is fairly definite but it is applicable only to a
portion of the covenants that have in fact been held to run. Second,
the key words of the statement, i. e., the terms "nature, quality, and
value," are -more or less question-begging, particularly the word
"value"; if a given covenant runs it will affect the value of the
thing demised, if it does not it will not so affect it; but this fact is of
no assistance in determining the primary question; this same obIo

East 130 (180S).

5 Co. x6 a (1583).
1 B. & C. 410 (1823).
No attempt will be made to cite all the cases of covenants. Collections of these
cases will be found among other places in Sims, Real Covenants xx6; i Smith's Leading
Cases, 9th I:d. x85 & ff.; Foa, Landlord and Tenant, 4th Ed., 417 & ff.
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jection in a less palpable way applies to the other two words. Without consuming more time in pointing out the unsatisfactoriness of
the formula as a working rule, it will be more profitable to proceed
to an analysis of the cases that have generally been said by the courts
to be within the scope of this rule.
It is but repeating familiar learning to call attention to the fact
that what is for the sake of brevity referred to as "title" in land
embraces various rights and duties. This is true both of the lessor's
title an'd the lessee's title. Taking up the title of the lessee, it may
be pointed out that he has certain rights in the strict sense with correlative duties on the part of those against whom the rights exist,
including among others the lessor; no further express mention will
be made of these rights, it being understood that the conclusions
hereinafter arrived at with respect to the rights next to be considered will also be true as a matter of principle with respect to the
rights (in the strict sense) good against the lessor. In addition
to these rights with their correlative duties the lessee has also those
rights, in the loose sense, that are more exactly defined as permissive
rights5 or privileges, i. e., there are certain courses of action which
because he is the owner, in a qualified sense, of the land, he may
pursue without violating the rights of other persons; he is under noduty to engage in these actions, he may legally do so if he wishes.
Thus he may till the land in whole or in part, he may build on it,
engage in bisiness on it, sell his interest in it and perform various
other acts upon it or with respect to it.
A covenant that restricts him in the exercise of any one or more
of these privileges constitutes a direct contractual limitation upon
the totality of legal rights that he would otherwise be free to
exercise with respect to the demised premises, and where the covenant creates a restriction on a privilege of action as to the actual
physical corpus it is clear that such a covenant does in the most
literal sense affect "the thing demised." The propriety of holding
such a covenant to run is obvious. It can have no significance save
as it applies to the tenant in possession of the premises. Hence it
is well settled that covenants of this sort will bind the assignees of
the lessee. Among the covenants to refrain from acting which have
been held enforceable by the lessor against the assign of the lessee
are the following: to let part of the land lie fallow every year;'
STerry-Anglo-American Law, pp. 90, 370. Salmond, Jurisp. 2nd Ed. p. xg expresses
the same idea by the term "liberty."
6 This term is used by Professor Hohfeld in an article in 23 Yale L. J. PP. s6, 32.
The term seems to be fully as expressive as either of the other two and more in accord
with judicial usage and it has been used throughout this article.
7 Cockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125 (1607).
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not to use for a particular business;8 not to conduct the business
in a specified way ;9 not to remove the fixtures ;1o not to sell off the
wood.1 '
Take now the same kind of covenant made not by the lessee but
by the lessor. The privileges with respect to the land possessed
by the lessor are much fewer than those of the lessee, but the same
principle should apply. A covenanf by the lessor that under certain
circumstances the lessee may remain in the demised premises after
the expiration of his lease is a covenant of this sort and has been
held binding on the lessor's assignee,'12 and there can be no doubt
on principle that the same would be true of a covenant by the
lessor not to enter and distrain for rent.
Reverting once more to a further analysis of the various rights
embraced in the conception of title it should be noted that in
addition to his privileges with respect to the physical corpus
of the demise, the lessee has certain other rights in the loose sense,
more exactly' designated as powers" or facultative rights, 14 i. e.
the de facto legal ability to affect those legal rights and relations
which he has as lessee. This affecting may be done either directly,
as where the lessee mortgages or assigns or subleases; or it may be
Doe d. Bish v. Keeling, x Al. & S. 95 (x813); Doe d. Gaskell v. Spry, i B. & Aid.
617 (i&S); De Forrest v. Byrne, z Hilt. (N. Y.) 43 (1856); Clements v. Wells, L. R.
IEq. 200 (rS65); Rolls v. Miller, L. R. 27 Ch. D. 71 (1884); Hall v. Ewin, L. R. 37
Ch. D. 74 (ISS7), injunctions against sublessees.
0 Crowe v. Riley, 63 Oh. St.
(1goo); Granite Co. v. Greene, 25 R. . 586 (29o4);
American Strawboard Co.'v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 6xg (1897); Wertheimer v.
Judge, S _i-ich.
(890); Stees v. Kranz, 32
3x3 (2884);
0inn. last two cases injunctions against sublessees. In Congleton v. Pattison, xo East I3o (x8o)
a covenant by
the lessee for himself and assigns that no persons should be allowed to work in the
demised mill until a certificate of their settlement should be given the lessor was held
not to be enforceable by the lessor against the assignee of the lessee. For comment on
this case see post p. 653. For other cases involving the same point as those already
cited, see post p. 653.
10Re Brick Co., 179 Fed. 525 (19IO).
21Verplanck v. Wright, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 5o6 (840); contra, I,ybbe v. Hart,
L. R. 29 Ch. D. 8, 19, (2883). This conflict is one of construction, not of principle. It
is necessary to note whether the covenant purports to limit the privileges that belong to
the tenant as the holder of the leasehold estate or as the owner of personal property.
The latter kind of covenant is purely personal. Thus a covenant not to cut down the
trees is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee as owner for the time being of the
soil, and should bind his assigns; a covenant not to sell off cut trees lying in the yard
is on its face a covenant restricting a privilege belonging to the tenant as owner of a
chattel. The court in the New York case might fairly have construed the covenant as
really meaning that the lessee should not sever the growing timber from the premises
by permitting it to be cut for purposes of sale. - See post pp. 646 and following.
12Callan v. McDaniel, 72 Ala. 96 (x88z). See also. Batchelder v. Dean, 16 N. H.
265 (1844).
"3See Salmond, Jurisprudence, 2d ed. § 76.
" See Terry, Ango-Am. Law, p. xoo.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

done indirectly by taking steps which will create this power in some
third person; that may be done voluntarily as where the lessee gives
a third person a power of attorney to assign or sublease; or it may
be done involuntarily as where the lessee engages in a course of
action that causes him to be adjudged a bankrupt. With these powers there exists in the lessee the privilege of exercising them.
The privilege of exercising one or more of these powers may be
restricted by covenant in precisely the same way as the privileges
with respect to the physical corpus of the lease. Such a covenant
will bind the assignee of the lessee for the reasons already pointed
out, viz. it can be operative only as it affects the tenant for the time
being. It constitutes a contractual restriction of the use, not of the
lphysical co-pus, but of the estate. Such covenants are universally
held to have come within the usual phrase and to "affect the thing
demised." In other words the term "thing demised" must be held
to include not only the land but the estate in the land. The most
common illustration of this type is the covenant not to assign or sublease without the consent of the lessor.' 5 The same principles apply
to a covenant not to suffer the obtaining of a prescriptive right
against the leased property, 0 and to a proviso for re-entry in case
of bankruptcy.'
Corresponding covenants by the lessor may be either to restrict
the exercise of the lessor's powers with respect to the estate of the
lessee or to restrict the exercise of his powers with respect to his
reversionary estate. A covenant that under certain circumstances
he would not enter and forfeit the lease would be a covenant of
This same principle would also seem applicable
the first sort.'
to a covenant by the lessor not to do an act that would give a third
person the power to enter and forfeit the estate. Such a situation
is suggested by the case of Dewar v. Goodman,'5 but it was not directly involved and hence was not discussed by the courts. A covenant by the lessor that under certain circumstances the rent should be
'$

Williams v.

Earle, L.

R. 3 Q. B. 739 (iS868);

Brolaskey v. Hood, 6 Phila. r93.

In Williams v. IEarle it is stated by way of dictum that while a covenant not to assign
without the consent of the lessor will run, a covenant not to assign will not run. If
this means that as a question of fact it may fairly be inferred from the form of the
covenant that since the parties did not intend that the covenant should run because they
did not contemplate the possibility of assignment, it is sound. If it means that as a
matter of law such a covenant cannot run it seems unsound.
6 Bally v. Wells, 3 Vils. 25 (769).
17Doe d. Bridgman v. David, Y C. M. & R. 405 (834); compare Horsey v. Steiger,
[899) 2 Q. B. D. 79.
13 Compare Bamford v. Hayley, 12 East 464 (x81o).

"Tbis case is considered at length, post pp. 65o. 656. 658.
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reduced, is a covenant that limits not the powers but the rights of the
20
lessor in his reversionary estate. Such a covenant also runs.
The most common illustration of a covenant restricting the powers
of the lessor with respect to his reversionary estate is a covenant
by the lessor to renew or extend the lease. Such a covenant is
everywhere held to run both against the assignees of the reversion
and in favor of the assignees of the lease. 21 The American cases
hold the same way as to the covenant by the lessor to convey the
fee. 22
In England it has, after some uncertainty, finally been held
by the Court of Appeal "3 that such a covenant is personal. So far
as the relation to the lessor's estate is concerned, both covenants are
identical in that they limit the lessor's privilege of exercising his
powers with respect thereto. These cases perhaps involve another
24
,principle and will be subsequently considered.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it follows that back of the
loose phrase "nature, quality, or value of the thing demised" there
is a perfectly clear-cut conception: viz., that of covenants restricting
the privileges and powers of either lessee or lessor as such. There
remains for examination a large number of covenants by the lessor
or lessee that cannot be disposed of on the principles already discussed. An attempt to settle by the classical formula the question
of the running of these widely varying covenants now to be considered reveals its lack of definiteness even more markedly than do
the cases already examined. Some of the covenants of the class
now to be taken up present no difficulty. The following covenants by the lessor have been held to enure to the assignee of the
lessee: to rebuild 2 5 or repair2 6 or plant 27 the premises; to supply

water - 8 or heat2 9. Of these covenants it may be said that they call
"IWhite v. Southend Hotel Co., [,897) x Ch. 767; Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio, (N. Y.)
284 (184 6).

21 Isteed v. Stonely, i And. 82 (i5go); Hyde v. Skinner, 2 P. Williams 296 (2723);
Cook v. Jones, 96 Ky. 283 (1894); Leominster Gas Co. v. Hillery, 197 Mass. 267 (1903);
McClintock v. Joyner, 77 Miss. 678 (19oo).
-Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 238 (z9o2); Hollander v. Metal Co., o9 Md. 232
(i9o); Rockland Lime Co. v. Learyo 203 N. Y. 469 (ipxz); Hagar v. Buck, 44 Vt.
285 (872).

"Woodall v. Clifton, [2905) 2 Ch. 257; compare Re Kensington Vestry, L. R. 24
Ch. D. z99 (r883), L. R. 27 Ch. D. 394 (I884). Whether such a covenant, assuming it
to be good so far as the principles here being discussed are concerned, would be bad
as violating the policy expressed in the rule against perpetuities is not within the scope
of this article.
"2Post p. 655.
n Pike v. Realty Co., 179 Fed. 97 (xgo).
2 Gerzebek v. Lord, 33 N. J. L. 240 (1869); MByers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269 (1866).
"-See Eccles v. Mills, [i8983 A. C. 360.
Jourdain v. Wilson, 4 B. "& Ald. 266 (1822).
Storand v. Vogel & Binder Co., 24o N. Y. App. Div. 67X (ipio); compare Jones
v. Powers, x63 Mass. 564 (1895).
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either for action by the lessor upon the demised premises or at least
for action that will be physically manifest upon those premises, and
hence may be said in a very palpable way to touch or concern them.
This criterion however will not apply to Simpson v. Clayton.3 ° In
that case A was tenant under a lease for three lives, he subleased
part of the premises to X for 6o years and covenanted that if the
head lease ran out first he would use his utmost endeavors to get it
renewed. This covenant was held to run to X's assignee, and
rightly, but it is only in a loose way that it can be said to relate
to the sub-lease; so far as its subject matter goes, it is rather the
head lease.
The same difficulty exists with respect to covenants by the lessee.
Those that call for action upon the demised premises may be said
without difficulty to "touch or concern the thing demised." Such
are covenants to build on the demised premises, 31 to live upon
them, 32 to keep them in repair,

3

to sink oil wells in them, 34 to

consume and spread on the land as manure all hay raised thereon.35
Compare, however, with these covenants the covenant by the lessee
to keep the premises insured. If by statute the lessor can avail himself of the proceeds of the policy to apply in rebt'ilding, 3 or if the
policy is to be taken in the name of the lessor for the time being,37
the covenant runs; a mere covenant to insure does not.3 1 No one
presumably would question the soundness of this distinction, yet,
so far as the covenants per se are concerned, both touch or concern
the thing demised; they both call for the taking out of a policy upon
the premises. Reference also may be made to Sampson v. Easterby." The facts in that case were these: A owned certain veins
of minerals, the adjacent soil being owned by a third person; A
apparently had a right to erect a mill thereon. A leased the veins
to X for a term of years and X covenanted to build an ore mill uporr
the adjacent land, which was not included within the demise. The
owners of the vein had however the right to remove such building. One would have difficulty in saying that this covenant related
Bing. N.

C. 758 (838).

,31 Anon., Moore s59 (I584).
32 Tatem v. Chaplin,

2

H.

BI. 133 (1793).

mDean of Windsor's Case, 5 CO. 24 a. (s6ox); Tilny v. Norris, s Salk. 309 (1701)..
3ABradford Oil Co. v. Blair, z13 Pa. St. 83 (1886).
Chapman v. Smith [19o7J 2 Ch. 97.
Vernon v. Smith. 5 B. & Aid. z (82).
"Masury v. Southworth. 9 Oh. St. 341 (1859); Trust Co. v. Snyder's Admin., 76Fed. 34 (1896). _
"Compare Reed v. 'McCrum, 9z N. Y. 412 (1883); the dictum of Best. J.. in.
Vernon v. Smith (supra) that such a covenant would run seems erroneous.
3"9 B. & C. 505 (1829); affirmed 6 Bing. 644 (1830).
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yet the
to the nature, quality or value of the demised veins of ore;
40
covenant was held to run to the assignee of the reversion.
The question now is this: is there any legal principle which runs
through these cases and the others presently to be considered, not
merely as a matter of coincidence, but as furnishing the ratio
decidendi upon which, consciously or otherwise, the courts have
proceeded? It is submitted that there is, and an examination of the
various elements comprised in the conception of title will show what
it is. Allusion has already been made4 ' to some of the elements
involved in this conception; to state it in more detail it may be said
that the person who has title to land has with respect thereto certain
rights in the narrow sense, privileges or permissive rights, powers
or facultative rights, immunities and duties. The covenants first
considered either limit some of these rights, privileges, or powers,
possessed by the covenantor. The determining characteristic of the
covenants now being considered is that they operate either to make
more valuable some of the rights, privileges, or powers possessed by
the covenantee or to relieve him in whole or in part of some of his
duties. Or to restate the proposition in a somewhat less technical
form; it will be noticed that the various covenants last mentioned as running have this characteristic, viz. that the act called
for must operate to the benefit of the holder for the time being
of the lease or reversion as the case may be. That is: the covenant might have been made to expire by its own terms when the
original covenantee gave up his interest; if the performance is
kept up it is intrinsically of such a nature that the person who
will now have the primary interest in it is not the original covenantee
but his successor in title, and as fast as any person in the chain of
title parts with his title he will, not merely as a matter of limitations created by the language of the deed, but because of what it is
that is to be done, cease to have any direct interest in the doing of
that act. As stated in these general terms, or even in the more
technical form first given, the principle is liable to misapplication
and it is therefore advisable, before taking up other covenants that
deserve special examination, to call attention to certain limitations
that are implicit in the rule as stated but which may be overlooked.
The first is this: where the covenant is of such a nature that the
performance of it might equally well be made to enure to the bene40 It is possible, although the opinions nowhere expressly so state, that the right to
erect a mill upon the adjacent premises was technically appurtenant to the lease of the
veins. In such case it may be said that the covenant called for the exercise of a right
appurtenant to the physical corpus of the demise and hence in a sense related to the
thing demised.
41Ante p. 640-s.
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fit of any given person, whether owner of an interest in the premises
or not, it is essentially personal, and the agreement of the parties
that the covenant is to enure to the benefit of the tenant or reversioner for the time being should make no difference. The tenant or
reversioner is interested in the performance of this covenant, not
because of his ownership of the land per se, but because he is
persona designata.4 2
The second limitation is this: while it is true that a covenant of
the sort now under consideration will not run unless it operates
to the benefit of the rights of the lessor or lessee as such, the converse of this proposition is not true. It is easy to suggest covenants
that will indirectly or mediately operate to the benefit of the covenantee with respect to his rights as owner of the soil, which
clearly do not run. Thus a covenant by a lessor of farm lands that
he will sell for the lessee all grain that shall be raised on the land
and shipped to him would seem clearly to be a personal covenant. On
the other hand a covenant by the lessor to maintain windbreaks upon
the demised premises would be a real covenant. Yet both operate
to make more valuable the privilege that thee lessee has, as owner
of the soil, of raising grain on it. The difference between the
covenants of course is, and this is fundamental, that the first covenant operates primarily to benefit the covenantee not in the exercise
of his privilege as owner of the soil but in the privilege that he has
as owner of a chattel, of selling it; although this fact may in turn
make more valuable the exercise of the privilege of raising grain.
The second covenant, on the other hand, operates directly to make
more valuable the exercise of the privilege of raising grain. The application of this distinction may in any case present two difficult
questions; one of fact as to what privilege or power of the coveAantee the covenant was primarily designed to and does protect, and
one of law whether the privilege or power in question is one that he
has as lessee or-otherwise. Courts may be expected to differ in the
conclusions to which they come on one or both of these points. The
rule contended for, however, seems to be justified as a matter of
principle and to furnish a rational connection between the covenant
and the title with which it passes as an incident.
Again it may be pointed out that these covenants that have been
held to run do not always operate exclusively for the benefit of
the covenantee; if the premises are mortgaged, for example, the
covenant to keep them insured so that the proceeds are available
for rebuilding, or the covenant to pay the taxes, may be almost as
4 See post p. 648.
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beneficial to the mortgagee as to the lessor. This, however, may be
admitted without either affecting the soundness of the doctrine
suggested or presenting any difficulty in the application thereof.
Taking up in detail the covenants which involve the principle just
stated, no difficulty is presented by those of the lessee. In addition
to the covenants already discussed 3 the following have also been
held to run: to pay the taxes oil the demised premises, 4 and to
reimburse for damages caused the demised premises where the act
would not constitute a violation of his duty as tenant.4 5

On the

other hand the following covenants by the lessee have been held
to be purely personal: a covenant to pay taxes on other property of
the lessor;40 to erect a building on other lands of the lessor; 7 to pay
the debts of the lessor.48
The covenants by the lessor other than those already considered, 49
while not wholly harmonious in their language, are for the most
part, so far as their results are concerned, in accordance with the
doctrine here contended for. One important group of such covenants is the covenant to pay for improvements made by the lessee
upon the demised premises. Many of the decisions upon this
covenant rest upon the ground that the covenant does not run
because of failure to mention assigns,5° or involve the question

whether the covenant to pay runs after a breach -by the original
covenantor:51 with these questions we have no concern.5 2 The
circumstances under which this covenant has been held to run will
be found to be of this sort: there is first a covenant by the lessee
to make the improvement-this covenant will bind the assignee of
the lessee for reasons already discussed. The reciprocal covenant
by the lessor has this content: it creates in the lessee, because of the
improvements, some kind of interest other than that which would
be created by the mere lease. This additional real interest in the
demised premises will pass with them to the assignee thereof, and
Ante pp. 644 and following.
Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 223 (x88 ); Mason v. Smith, 131 M%1ass.51o (88);
4
Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 603 (I83O). Many cases turn simply upon the question
of what taxes were meant to be thrown upon the lessee; see Jeffrey v. Neale, 1'. R. 6
C. P. 240 (1871), Allum v. Dickinson, L. R. 9 (. B. D.
632 (1882).
45Martyn v. Williams, x H. & N. Sr7 (1857).
40 Gower v. Postmaster General, 57 L. T. R. (N. S.) 527 (1887).
See Jeffrey v.
Neale, L. R. 6 C. P. 240 (87r).
11Smith v. Arnold. 3 Salk. 4 (689); compare Sampson v. Easterby, ante p. 644.
-S Mayho v. Buckhurst, Cro. Jac. 438 (x618); Dolph v. White, 12 N. Y. 296 (x855).
4' Ante p. 643-4.
'

t4 See Etowah v. Wills Valley Co., 727 Ala. 672 (x898); Watson v. Gardner, 1s9

IHI. 312 (1887); Coffin v. Tallman, 8 N. Y. 465 (1854).
51 Gardner v. Samuels, 116 Cal. 84 (1897).
MSee ante p. 639.
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the covenant by the lessor with respect to payment is, in substance
if not in form, a covenant to buy up or extinguish this real right.
Such a covenant is one, the performance of which, i. e., the payament, can enure only to the person who has this real interest to
sell, and -that person must be the tenant for the time being. Such
are cases where the covenant provides that the lessee may remove
"3
the fixtures if the lessor does not pay for them, or that the lessor
5
- or that the lessee
period,
will pay or renew the lease for a stated
is made,5 5 or that
payment
the
until
in
remain
to
shall have a right
he shall have a lien upon the property for the value of the improve56
iments, or even a mere covenant "to purchase" the improvements, 1
to
is
title
the
since the fair inference from such a covenant is that
menabove
cases
the
of
Some
payment.
until
remain in the tenant
tioned contain dicta to the effect that, in any case where there is
a covenant by the lessee to make improvements, a covenant by the
lessor to pay therefor will run, even though the lessee has no real
right of the sort above mentioned. This is true only to a qualified
degree. The benefit of such a covenant would run until the improvement had been made by any given tenant, whether the lessee
or his assignee. The covenant is to pay a person putting improve-ments upon the land, and that person can be only a tenant, and the
.covenant enures to his benefit because he makes the improvement.
But if the situation contemplated by the lease is that at the expiration thereof all rights of the then tenant in the premises should
'completely determine, a covenant by the lessor to pay the then tenant
for the value of the improvements, irrespectivb of who put them
there, is merely a covenant to pay a sum of money to a person
-answering a certain description, viz., occupant of the premises at
the moment when the lease expires. Such a covenant no more
benefits the lessee as such than would a covenant by the lessor to
devise his property to the person who answered that description,
.and will neither bind the assignee of the lessor nor enure to the
There are two factors that may exist in
assignee of the lessee."
this latter case which involve legal principles totally different from
those now being discussed. Admitting that this covenant does not
Hunt v. Danforth, 2 Curtis 592 (x856).
" Hollywood v. Parish, 192 Mass. 269 (r9o6);

Phillips v. Reynolds, 20 Wash. 374

,(1398).
Batchelder v. Dean, r6 N.
App.) 5o S. W. 599 (x899).

H. 265 (1844); Hazlewood v. Pennypacker, (Tex.

Civ.

" Frederick v. Callahan, 40 Ia. 3i5 (1875).
I Gardner v. Samuels, ix6 Cal. 84 (897); Wilcox v. Kehoe, 124 Ga. 484 (9o5);
Bream v. Dickerson, 2 Humph. (21 Tenn.) 126 (840); contra; Stockett v. Howard, 34
Md. 12r (1870) semble; Lametti v. Anderson, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 302 (1826); see ante
p. 645-6.
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,enure to the assignees of the lease, the original lessee may assign
to the assignee of the lease all his contract right against the original
covenantor, and the assignee may be able to avail himself of this
-either by set-off or otherwise: again, this fact or the -further fact
that the assignee has in good faith put the improvements upon the
premises may give him relief upon quasi-contractual grounds, either
against the original lessor or his assignee. These considerations
are quite outside the scope of this article.58
It is commonly stated by the text writers that a covenant to
indemnify is collateral. In some cases this is undoubtedly true.
Thus, a covenant by or in favor of a third person, not a party to
the lease, would not come within the statute of covenants of 32 H.
.8, ch. 34 or corresponding modern statutes, and could be only a per.sonal contract.Y So a covenant that purported to indemnify against
loss or damage to other than the rights possessed by the covenantee
as tenant of the leasehold would also be collateral. Another appli.cation of the same limitation would be in a case where A leased to X
.and made a covenant which would not run, either because it was intrinsically collateral or because proper phraseology was not used,
and A then made a second covenant to indemnify X against all
.breaches of the covenants contained in the lease. Such a covenant
would not run against the assigns of A or to the assigns of X; to
hold otherwise would render it possible in substance to make all kinds
of covenants run. Compare with these cases, however, the following: A leases to M who covenants, for himself and assigns, to build
.a house on the demised premises; the lease gives a right of re-entry
for breach. M subleases to X and covenants, not for his assigns, to
-observe and perform, or indemnify X from the proviso and covenants in the head lease to be performed by the mesne lessee or assigns.
M assigns to N who does not perform; A enters and evicts X. Held
that X has no right of action against N."0 So far as the covenant
to build was concerned N was under no obligation to X in that
regard, the assigns not being mentioned, and a covenant to indemnifv for a breach of that covenant clearly'would not run. On the
,other hand, a covenant by M that he would so perform the conditions of the head lease that the sublessee should not be evicted
,should bind M's assignee N. Admitting that N would be under no
.obligation to X to perform the covenant to build, N was under such
an obligation to the head lessor in that regard that the non-per1 See Conover v. Smith, 17
Berrie v. Woods, 12 Ont. Rep.
0' Walsh v. Fussell, 6 Bing.
,:"Doughty v. Bowman, xi

N. J. Iq. 51 (1864) ; :cke v. Fetzer, 65 WVis. 55 (1886);
693 (1887).
163 (1829) ; see Walsh v. Packard, 165 Mass. 189 (1896).
Q. 13. N. S. 444 (1849).
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formance of the covenant might be, if the head lessor chose to
enforce the forfeiture, 61 of direct consequence to the sublessee in
that the rights of the sublessee in the demised premises would
thereby be terminated. A covenant by the mesne lessee to indemnify against damages resulting from the breach of this last mentioned covenant would also run, for it would be in effect a covenant
to make good losses resulting from the breach of a covenant that
would itself be binding upon him in favor of the sub-lessee. There
is nothing in the opinion of the court in Doughty v. Bowman to indicate that it would consider that such a covenant as this latter
"wouldnot run. In the actual case the covenant was a single one i. e.,
to indemnify for all breaches of the terms of the head lease. This
would include not only those breaches which might result in a forfeiture of the sublessee's interest, but any breaches which would
result in damage to the sublessee, whether through forfeiture or otherwise. The court held that this covenant could not be split, and
being broad enough to include breaches that would be collateral as
regards the sublessee, it could not be held good so far as it related
only to breaches that were collateral.62 This is sound: but it should
be noticed that the case does not involve the proposition that a cov63
enant to indemnify is for that reason alone necessarily collateral.
Whether a covenant by the lessor not to compete with the lessee
01It was suggested on similar facts in Dewar v. Goodman, [1907) 1 I. B. 61a,
that the fact that the head lessor might not elect to take advantage of the breach by
the mesne lessee to enter and terminate the estate of the sublessee showed that the
covenant affected the thing demised only in respect of collateral circumstances. This
suggestion seems irreconcilable with the position taken by the Court of Appeal in Horsey
v. Steiger, [1899] 2 L. B. 79. In that case a lease contained a proviso for re-entry if
the lessee should go into liquidation. A corporation, the assignee of the original lessee,
went into voluntary liquidation proceedings for the purpose of effecting a reorganization.
The court pointed out the difference between bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings,
viz., that the latter, unlike the former, do not necessarily involve a dealing with the
title; the result of the liquidation proceedings is not per se to vest the title in the
liquidator but merely to give him the power to dispose of the title if in his discretion it shall become necessary so to do. The proviso was held, nevertheless, to be
enforceable against the assignee of the lessee, providing proper statutory notice of an
intent to enforce the forfeiture was given. "It is sufficient if * * * the act relied upon
will in the ordinary course of events involve dealing with the interest in, or possession
of, the premises" (Foa, Landlord and Tenant, 4 th Ed. 421). This seems sounder than
the view suggested in the Dewar case; if the landlord does not enforce the forfeiture this
goes to the question of damages, but the possibility that in a given case he may not
elect to enforce his rights has very little bearing on the question whether the covenant
is or is not adapted to the protection of the covenantee in his rights as lessee.
12"If the covenant declared)upon presents an alternative, it is merely a covenant
to indemnify. Is that then ad idem with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, assuming that
that covenant would pass? It is not. It might be broken in other ways than a covenant
for quiet enjoyment and is therefore larger. And it cannot be split merely because one
breach of it may affect the estate while the other is collateral." Parke B., i x Q. B. N. S.
454ei Doughty v. Bowman was followed in Dewar v. Goodman, ante, n. 61.
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is more than personal, is a point upon which there is a division of
authority. In Thomas v. Haywood64 it was held that a covenant by
the lessor not to open a saloon within a mile of the saloon leased
to X was not enforceable by X's assignee. On substantially the
same facts the opposite conclusion was reached in Norman v.
Wells. 5 Applying to these cases the principles already suggested
as underlying this group, the first question would be as to the nature
of the right protected by the covenant. It is clearly a privilege belonging to the lessee as such, it is not the mere selling of liquor
that is protected, that privilege he has as owner of the chattel; it is
the privilege of selling liquor in this particular place. That he has
only because he is the owner for the time being of that place. Thus
far there is no difference between the covenant in question and a
covenant by the lessor not to build on an adjacent piece in such a
way as to darken the rooms in the lessee's house. "0 Both covenants
tend to render more valuable the lessee's privileges of action upon
the demised premises.- The latter covenant clearly would enure to
the benefit of the lessee's assignee. Why not the former? While
the privileges protected by both covenants must in the last analysis
be expressed in terms of human action, as must all rights, there is
this difference between them: the privileges protected by the covenant not to build may be said to be exercised by the lessee merely
as a human being for the enjoyment of his personal physical needs
of air, light, quiet, and the like; the privileges protected by the
covenant not to compete are exercised by the lessee because so doing
enures in a larger or smaller degree not to his physical benefit as
a human being but to his financial benefit as a seller of liquor. This
difference may be more briefly and somewhat metaphorically expressed by saying that one covenant enures to the physical benefit
of the land, the other to its financial benefit. 7 Whether a distinction
should be made between covenants that enure to the benefit of privileges that have their value for the one or the other reason is a point
upon which courts may reasonably differ. It should be noticed,
however, that in Thomas v. Hayz'ood and Norman v. Wells the
question at issue was merely as to whether the benefit of the covenant ran to the assignee of the lessee as against the original covenantor. The question of running of the burden presents a different
problem that will be subsequently considered.08 Furthermore, even
assuminz that the burden of such a covenant should not run in a
"L. R. 4 E-1. 311 (1869).
1As7
Wend. (N. Y.) 136 (1837).
'A

See Ricketts v. Enfield Churchwardens,

[go9]

i Ch. 544, post p. 656.

G7See Holmes, J., in Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188 (1885).
's See post p. 656 and following.
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conveyance of the fee, it should be noticed that there is a marked
difference between an attempt to tie up land in perpetuity and the
restriction given by the lessor for the term of an ordinary short
term lease.
To restate, in a word, the characteristics of the two groups into
which the covenants that have been examined are divisible, it may
be said that the reason why the first kind of what are essentially
contract relations will pass with a conveyance of the title, the bond
that connects them with the land, is found in the nature of the
burden created by the covenant. It is fundamentally a limitation
upon rights that form a part of the title to the land. As to the second group the basis of its connection with the land is in the character
of the benefit conferred. It is fundamentally A benefit to the person
who has the title and in respect of the title. There remains for
consideration this question: if the obligation imposed by the covenant limits the real rights of the covenantor so that the burden of it
will pass to his assignee, is it necessary, in *order that the rights
under that covenant should pass to the assignee of the covenantee,
that it should benefit him with respect to the real rights that he has
as such assignee? A similar question may be put as to covenants
of the second class, or the whole problem may be more generally
stated thus: if either the burden or the benefit of a covenant has the
connection with the title outlined above, will both ends of the covenant run or will each end run only as it has this connection?
Taking first those covenants where the connection with the title
is found in the nature of the burden thereby created, it will be
remarked that many of those covenants that limit the lessee in the
exercise of his privileges or rights as such lessee do in fact necesIt is not universally true,
sarily satisfy both these requirements.e
however, and whether it is true in any given case may depend upon
the question of fact as to the lessor's motive in taking the covenant.
Thus suppose A leases to X a shop and takes a covenant from X
that he will not use the shop for the sale of liquor. A may take this
covenant because he believes that the use of the premises for a
saloon will make his reversionary interest worth less, or because he
has other property in the neighborhood that will be depreciated in
value by the existence of a saloon, or because he runs a neighboring
saloon, or because he is opposed on principle to the sale of liquor.
On the first supposition he is taking the covenant in his character
as landlord and to protect his reversionary interest; on the next
two suppositions he is taking it to protect his other premises and
1

See ante pp. 640-I. 642.
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on the last supposition he is taking it for purely personal reasons
entirely unrelated to his ownership of any land.70 If now X assigns
his lease to Y, A ought to be able to enforce this covenant against
Y. To say that Y takes the title minus this privilege is to beg
the question: this much is certain however; viz. that the covenant
in question was intended to be an inseperable limitation upon the
freedom of action of the lessee with respect to that land. The
land was A's and if he chose to part with it only subject to this
restriction as to its use his motive in creating that restriction should
make no difference. There are several cases in which it has been
held or stated that a covenant taken by the lessor obviously for his
benefit not as owner of the reversion but of another business is
binding upon the assignee of the lessee.71
If now A assigns his reversionary interest to B it seems clear
that B ought not to be able to enforce this covenant. Ex hypothesi
it was taken not for the benefit of A's reversion but for some other
purpose: the fact that it is a limitation on the estate held by X or
his assignee Y would seem immaterial unless it can be shown that
B has the interest that was intended to be benefitted by the covenant.
There is very little authority on the point. In Clegg v. Hands7 2 the
judges all agreed that the right to enforce such a covenant did pass
although they rested the decision on other grounds. LoPis L. J.
said7" "In my opinion it (the covenant to sell only beer furnished
70The fact that the covenant is incorporated in the lease raises a presumption that
it was meant to be an integral part of the group of correlative rights and duties created
thereby; and if it is an open question whether the covenant was taken as an incident
to the reversion or otherwise, it ought to be regarded as belonging legally with the
other rights created by the same instrument and pass with the reversion. Furthermore,
A in assigning to B may not only assign to him his reversionary interest in the premises
but in addition thereto his contract rights against the lessee. In any of these situations
B is entitled, for one reason or the other, to enforce the covenant. Most of the cases
are of this kind. See Clegg v. Hands, L. R. 44 Ch. D. 503 (8go); White v. Southend
Hotel Co., [1897) 1 Ch. 767; Manchester Brewing Co. v. Coombs, Egos] a Ch. D. 6o8.
n'Uxbridge v. Staveland, r Ves. Sr. 56 (747) semble; Jones v. Edney, 3 Camp.
285 (iSz); Clegg v. Hands, L. R. 44 Ch. D. 503 (89o); White v. Southend Hotel Co.
[1897] 1 Ch. 767; American Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 6x9 (189").
Congleton v. Pattison, so East 130 (s8o8) is apparently the only decision the other
way. A leased to X a mill and took a covenant from X that no non-parish laborers
should be employed in the mill who did not have a settlement in some other parish.
Lord Ellenborough held that this covenant was not enforceable by the lessor against the
assignee of the lessee. He said * * * "How then does it (the covenant) affect the mode
of occupation? * * * The carrying on of a particular trade may do that, but where the
work to be done is at all events the same, whether it be done by workmen .from one parish
or another cannot affect the mode of occupation."
This statement is, it is submitted,
unsound. A covenant not to employ a particular class of laborers in a mill is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee, as such, just as much as a covenant not to make
or sell a particular article on the premises,
L. R. 44 Ch. D. 503 (1890).
T'Ibid. p. 523.
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by the lessor or his assigns) touches and concerns the demised
74
premises and therefore it runs with the reversion."

75

Thurston v.

76

Minke is a decision the other way. In that case the facts were
these: A owned two parcels of land, on one of which was a hotel.
He leased the other lot to X with a proviso that no building erected
thereon should exceed three stories in height. A later sold the reversion to B, keeping the hotel parcel. A was allowed to enjoin X against
a subsequent attempt to erect on the leased lot a building of more
than three stories. The contention that the benefit of the proviso
passed to the assignee of the reversion was overruled by the court,
it finding that the proviso was inserted for the benefit of A not as
lessor but as owner of the hotel lot. This decision, though purporting to go on equitable grounds, seems also correct as to the running at law of such a covehant. It is submitted that there is nothing
in the 32 H. 8, ch. 34, properly construed, that compels the doctrine
that if one end of a covenant runs with the leasehold interest the
other must necessarily run with the reversion. Just as a leasehold
may be burdened with an easement in favor of another piece of
land7 7 so on principle it may be burdened with a covenant in favor
of another piece of land and the runnings of such a covenant would
be determined not by statute but by the common law.
Only a few words are needed as to the application of a similar
limitation to the covenants of the lessor. What has been said with
respect to the lessee's covenants is equally applicable, mzutatis nmutandis, to the lessor's covenants. One may go -even farther. The
lessee's estate is a subordinate estate; out of the fee simple of A is
carved the smaller estate of X. It is derived from A, and hence, as
was pointed out, 78 any limitation on the rights of that estate, no mat-

ter why imposed, should be enforceable by A personally against any
subsequent taker of the lease. Such of course is not the relation
of A's estate to X's estate, and hence it may well be doubted on
principle whether even the original covenantee, the lessee, could enforce as against an assignee of the reversion a covenant that did not,
in addition to restricting the rights comprised in the reversionary
title, also operate to the,benefit of the lessee with respect to his
rights as such. Practically all covenants by the lessor do however
satisfy both these requirements. The only covenants by the lessor
74My italics.
See also White v. Southend
- Ace. Hamley v. Hendon,* 12 Mod. 327 (1699) semble.
Hotel Co., ante p. 653; Zetland v. Hislop, L. R. 7 A. C. (Sc.) 427 (1882); Foa, Landlord
& Ten. 4 ed. 435.
" 32 Md. 497 (870).
I Cole's Case, i Salk. x96 (1692); Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 N. 3. Eq. 61g (i89i).
-1Ante, p. 653.
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that suggest this question are the covenants to renew the lease and
to convey the fee simple.7 9 Both of these are covenants relating
to and curtailing the privilege of exercising powers of the holder
of the reversionary interest. A covenant to renew or extend the
lease, technically speaking, can be of value only to the tenant for the
time being because the lease can be renewed only to the present
holder. On the other hand a covenant to grant a new lease, if it be
taken literally, or a covenant to sell the fee simple, is a covenant the
performance of which will not enure to the tenant with respect to
the rights that he now has. It is merely a chance to buy an interest
in land and that chance is substantially as valuable to a person
whether or not he is now tenant. Hence the question whether the
covenant is, under 32 H. 8, ch. 34, real or personal, would on principle not be difficult of answer. Such a covenant would seem clearly
personal. How far the American cases are necessarily in conflict
with this doctrine it is hard to say. Practically all the cases are for
specific performance. So far as the rights of the lessee go, he can
enforce his equitable interest against any purchase of the reversion
with notice quite aside from the question whether the covenant is
real or personal; so far as the rights of an assignee of the lessee
go, he will succeed in his bill for specific performance if he shows
that the original covenantee's right has been vested in him, and
whether this right has come as a real covenant attached to the lease
or as a personal claim transferred by some general language of
assignment is ordinarily immaterial.
There now remains for consideration the converse of the problem
just discussed, namely: if the covenant enures to the covenantee
in respect of his rights as lessee or lessor so that the benefit of the
covenant will pass to his assignee, will the burden pass to the assignee of the covenantor irrespective of whether it limits his rights
as owner or imposes an obligation upon him not necessarily related
to the land? Here as elsewhere it should be noticed that most
covenants do in fact satisfy both requirements.
As to covenants by the lessee the answer is clear on the authorities: if the covenants benefit the lessor with respect to his reversionary interest they will bind the assignee of the lessee irrespective
of whether or not the covenant limits the lessee's rights or privileges.
The covenants to insure and to pay taxes 0 are cases of this kind.
The rule can be justified on principle because of the derivative
nature of the lessee's estate; and the fact that these acts beneficial
" These cases are cited ante p. 643.
"' Ante pp. 644, 647.
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to the lessor as such are in the nature of a continuing quid pro quo
for the land.
Whether the burden of a covenant by the lessor that benefits the
lessee as such should merely for that reason, follow the reversion
into the hands of an assignee is more difficult of decision. It is
arguable that the second section of 32 H. 8, ch. 34, which gives the
lessee and his assigns the same rights against the assignee of the
lessor as against the lessor will produce the same result that follows from the subordinate nature of the lessee's estate in the situation just considered, and that since the covenant is made by the
lessor for the purpose of benefitting the lessee's estate it is for this
reason alone within the purview of the statute. So far as the decisions go those that deal with the liability of the assignee of the
lessor under these circumstances hold him to be bound."'
Admitting that there may be covenants of this sort binding upon
the assignee of the lessor although not affecting his rights or privileges as owner of the reversion, there is a further limitation upon
this possibility that should be noticed. The act to be performed by
the covenantor may be an act the locus of the performance of which
is a matter of indifference (as a covenant to purchase the improvements), or it may necessarily be performable on the demised premises (as a covenant to install a heating plant), or it may necessarily
be performable upon or the covenant may be to refrain from performance upon another specified piece of land. The first two cases
present no difficulty once it is admitted that a covenant by the lessor
may bind his assignees even though it does not limit his reversionary rights. As regards the third case the fact that the covenant is
performable elsewhere should not affect the running of the benefit,
5

'Ante p. 647 and following. See also, Mansel v. Norton, L. R.

Gerzebek v. Lord, 33 N.J.IL. 240 (i69);

22 Ch. D. 769 (1883);
Myers v. Burns, 35 N.Y. 269 (r866); Storandt

v. Vogel & Binder Co., 14o N. Y. App. Div. 671 (pxso).
m To this effect are Ricketts. v. Enfield Churchwardens Esgog ] i Ch. 544; Morris v.
Kennedy EI896J 2 I. R. 247; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. (N.

Y.) 136, (1837),

ante p 651

n. 65-66. Compare Thomas v. Haywood, L. R. 4 EL 311, (1869), ante p. 6s1 n. 64. In
Dewar v. Goodman, 1907] 1 K. B. 612, [1908] 1K. B. 94, Esgog] A. C. 72, the facts
were these: A leased to M on long term lease a tract of land containing 2oo buildings
with a covenant by M and upon condition that he should keep the buildings in repair.
M sub-leased two buildings to X taking- a covenant from X to keep the two buildings in
repair and covenanting with X to perform so much of the covenants and conditions in
the head lease as related to the premises not included in the sub-lease. All the covenants
and conditions purported to bind and enure to assigns. A assigned to B, M to N, and
X to Y.
N did not keep in repair the buildings not included in the sub-lease and B
entered and retook possession of the entire tract including the two buildings of the
sub-lease. N was held not liable to Y for breach of covenant. That the act was not to
be performed upon the premises included in the sub-lease was apparently regarded by
some of the judges as determining its character as a personal covenant even with respect

to the benefit.
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since that is ex hypothesi connected with the lessee's estate.8 2 If

the lessor assigns the reversion and the other piece to different
persons, it becomes necessary to determine in what capacity the
lessor has covenanted. Since he owns both pieces it is conceivable
that he should have intended to covenant not as the lessor but as
the owner of the other piece. In such a case the obligations of that
assignee would not come within the scope of 32 H. 8, ch. 34 but
would depend on common law principles. Since in England the
burden of a covenant will not run at law except between landlord
and tenant,8 3 the purchaser of the second piece would not be liable
to an action at law; whether he would be liable in equity would
depend on whether the covenant was negative or affirmative and
whether he took with or without notice. s Since in this country
the burden of a covenant will in most jurisdictions run at law there
would seem no reason on principle why such a covenant should not
be held binding upon a purchaser of the burdened piece.8 5
If the covenant does not bind the assigiees of the other piece it
would seem that the burden would necessarily be personal to the
lessor; to hold the assignees of the reversion upon such a covenant
would be to make them guarantors of the performance of a covenant
over which they had no control. If this be true it would follow that
the fact that the reversion and the second piece were in a given case
both conveyed to the same person should make no difference. The
covenant being in its nature essentially personal, the fact that the
particular assignee of the reversion could legally perform the covenant because he happened also to be the owner of the land upon
which the performance was to be made, would be immaterial. It is
submitted that this is the ground upon which the decision in the
7
case of Dewar v. Goodman8" could most safely have been rested:
There is a third group of covenants, few in number, to which
reference should be made for the sake of completeness. Those
are the covenants that merely repeat in terms of contract an already
3 See Austerberry v. Oldham, L. R. 29 Ch. D. 750, 780 (1885).
r4 Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 403 (s88r). As to
the possibility of the covenant being made binding upon the second piece of land,
compare Kemp v. Bird, I. R. s Ch. D. 549 (I877); Ashby v. Wilson, Egoo x Ch. 66.
85In Noonan v. Orton, 27 Wis. 300 (870), the court held the purchaser of the
second piece bound by the covenant in favor of the lessee. Compare Taylor v. Owen,

2

Blackf. (Ind.)

3o

(83o).

8 Ante, p. 656, n. 82.
7 To the same effect is Hebert v. Dupaty, 42 La. Ann. 343 (i9o). Compare
Vyvyan v. Arthur, x B. & C. 410 (1823), post. p. 658, n. 88. In Athol v. R. R.. Ir. Rep.
3 C. L. 333 (r868) a covenant by the lessor that the lessee might draw the surplus water
from the lessor's canal was held enforceable by an assignee of the lessee against an
assignee of the lessor of both reversion and canal. Though couched in terms of covenant,
the right created in this case is clearly an easement.
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existing obligation running from the covenantor to the covenantee.
The covenant to'pay rent is the most obvious illustration of this type
of covenant. Whether historically the covenant to pay 'rent is not
to be differentiated from the covenants hitherto considered raises a
different question, but for purposes of the present classification, it
belongs in this third group. 8 Another covenant by the lessee of
the same species is the covenant to commit no waste. A similar
covenant by the lessor is the covenant for title that the lessee shall
This is the case where the
quietly enjoy the demised premises.s
scope of the express covenant is no greater than the common law
liability of the lessor; if it is greater, the covenant falls in the
second group already discussedP °
To summarize with respect to the first two groups, for as just
pointed out, the third group is sui generis and requires no comment: One clean-cut category of covenants, viz., those restricting
the real rights of the lessee, will run with the leasehold under all
circumstances; a second group, those covenants by the lessee that
benefit the lessor with respect to his reversionary estate, as defined
herein, will run both with the leasehold and with the reversion.
covenants by the lessee of the first sort ought not to run with the
reversion unless they also satisfy the test of the second group; it
is doubtful if this latter statement represents English law; there
seems to be nothing in the American decisions opposed to it. Covenants by the lessor of the first class will almost universally satisfy,
also, the test of the second class, i. e., benefit the lessee as such:
they should be purely personal unless they do: this is true of the
English decisions and in most cases of .the American decisions:
s See Athoe v. Hennings, x Rolle 80, s. c. Bulst. 281 (i61S). Cases holding the
covenant to pay rent binding on the assignees of the lessee are Stevenson v. Lambard,
2 East 575 (1802); Webster v. Nicolls, 104 Ill. 16o (1882); Jones v. Gundrim, 3 W. & S.
(Pa.) 531 (i84.); so of a rent in kind, Beach v. Barons, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 305 (5g8o).
That the amount of rent is to be fixed by reference to extrinsic transactions does not
affect the running of the covenant; thus: amount of rent fixed by amount of traffic over
railroad, Hemingway v. Fernandes, 13 Sir. 228 (x842); Hastings v. Eastern Ry.,
[i898] 2 Ch. 674; see also Keppel v. Bailey, 2 M. & Y 517 (1834); fixed by amount of
damage done other land of lessor, Norval v. Pascoe, 34 L. J. Chan. N. S. 8a (r864);
fixed by amount of grain raised on land, Raphoe v. Hawksworth, r Huds. & Br. 6o6
(1828); fixed by amount of oil obtained from land, Fennell v. Guffey, 139 Pa. St. 341
(IS90).
In Vyvyan v. Arthur, i B. & C. 410 (1823) the lease contained this clause after the
reddendum, "doing suit to the mill of the said Thomas (the lessor) his heirs and
assigns * * * by grinding all such corn there as should grow in or upon the close
demised." Action was allowed by the assignee of the lessor of both mill and reversion
against the administrator of the lessee for breaches both before and after the lessee's
death. Unless the case is to be sustained upon the theory that this reservation amounted
to a rent service, it seems wrong. See also Raphoe v. Hawsworth, supra.
11Shelton v. Cochrane, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 318 (1849).
50 Ante p. 641 and following.
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if the covenant benefits the lessee as such the benefit thereof will
pass to his assignee; even though the covenant does not also restrict
the estate of the lessor it seems clear that the 32 H. 8, ch. 34 or
similar American statutes, will cause the burden of this covenant
to pass to the assignee of the reversion unless the locus of the act is
on another piece of land, in which case both in this country and in
England either it binds the assignees of the other piece or is personal to the lessor.
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